The Great East Japan Earthquake and Disabled Persons
Their High Mortality Rate, Factors that Hindered the Support and the Current Challenges
Katsunori Fujii
Chairperson of the Executive Board
Japan Disability Forum
[Provisional Translation]
United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Building Inclusive Society and Development through Promoting ICT Accessibility: Emerging Issues and Trends
Special Session on "Towards disability-inclusive and responsive disasters and emergency response and management through Promoting Accessibility"
Cosponsored by: The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the United Nations Information Center and the Nippon Foundation
Venue: The Nippon Foundation, Tokyo Japan,
Time: 9.30-11.30am, 20 April 2012
Introduction
The Great East Japan Earthquake (referred to as the Earthquake hereinafter) has left a deep extended scar in the disability sector amongst other domains. More than a year has passed since the Earthquake, yet the accurate extent of casualties of disabled persons is still unknown. Japan Disability Forum (JDF) has been requesting the Government of Japan through Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare to conduct thorough research on 1) the number of disabled persons who fell victim, 2) the living conditions of disabled persons after the disaster and 3) the effectiveness of the existing disaster reduction policies from the disability perspective. However, no formal reply has been received yet.
In the meantime, the local government, media and NGOs have conducted their own studies. Based on their results, this report outlines 1) the high victim rate of disabled persons and its background and 2) the controversial points of the counter disaster policies from the disability perspective. Also, discussion will be done on the support activities provided by JDF since the outbreak of the disaster and the subsequent challenges faced by disabled persons.
1. A remarkably high mortality rate of disabled persons
On September 11, 2011, six months after the Earthquake, the NHK aired a TV program titled "Disabled Persons Left Behind". At the beginning of the program, they reported the number of disabled people who fell victim to the Earthquake (excluding the number of the missing people and the killed). This was the outcome of the research conducted by the NHK in the major disaster-stricken region; 27 municipalities responded to its survey out of 30 contacted where more than 10 people were killed. According to the study, the death rate against the total population was 1.03%, whereas that of disabled persons was 2.06%. "Disabled persons" here is defined as those with physical, intellectual and/or mental disabilities who are officially registered as such by the government (excluding those who have disabilities caused by intractable diseases, developmental disabilities and higher-brain dysfunctions and are not officially registered). In the subsequent and related program aired on March 11, 2012, partial modifications were made to the figure but nothing much has been changed fundamentally.
On March 29, 2012, the first administrative report of its kind was released by the Miyagi Prefectural authorities under the title "the Damage from the Great East Japan Earthquake" (as of February 28, 2012). The report states that the death rate against the total population of the coastal area of Miyagi was 0.8% while that of the registered disabled persons was 3.5%. Comparisons of the mortality rate of the disabled persons and the mortality rate against the total population indicates, the former is twice as high as that of the latter according to the NHK survey and 4.3 times higher in the Miyagi Prefecture's statistics. These are horrifying figures for us disabled persons.
A more detailed examination of the report reveals large differences between 1) municipalities (e.g. the death rate of the disabled persons in Onagawa city, Miyagi was approximately 15 %) and 2) types of disabilities (those with hearing disabilities had the highest death rate).
2. The background of the high mortality rate
The most important question for us is this: "Why was the mortality rate of the disabled persons so high?" Pending further analyses, at least two observations can be made. First, the existing counter-disaster policy is ineffective from the disability perspective. The earthquake and tsunami attacked all the citizens regardless who they were. However, the abnormally high death rate of the disabled persons tells more than just that this was a natural disaster. There is apparently a factor related to disability, and therefore this also needs to be addressed. It was also a man-made disaster; that is, the counter-disaster policies were defective.
Second, the standard of the support policy for the disabled persons in peacetime may be related to their death rate (the extent of damage). Most of the disaster stricken areas had scarce social resources for disabled persons (workplace, housing, personal support system, etc.). This fact seems to correlate with the extent of the damage.
It should also be noted that the concentrated and accumulated impact of the disaster on the disabled persons is not only seen in the death rate but also in the various stages of their life after the disaster, such as life under disrupted lifelines, and their livings at the evacuation centers and temporary housing.
3. Powerless "List of People Who Need Support in Emergencies", and hindrance of the "Private Information Protection Law"
As defects of "disabled persons and counter disaster policy" became obvious, two major issues have emerged. One is regarding "the Guideline on Evacuation Support for the People Who Need Support in Case of Disaster" (so called "the List of People Who Need Support in Emergencies") issued on May 30, 2005 by the Central Disaster Prevention Council. However, no municipalities reported to us its efficacy. The followings are the fundamental problems pointed out; 1) possible limitations during a massive disaster, 2) ineffectiveness due to aged people being expected to act as support providers, and 3) the small number of the registered disabled people. More detailed studies are therefore required.
The other is about the Private Information Protection Law (enforced on May 30, 2003). In reality, this acted as a barrier during safety confirmation at the earliest stage of the disaster and even as hindrance to the current support activities, consequently weakening the aids by the NGOs. Thus, some heads of municipalities took a decisive step to disclose the list of people who needed support and of the disabled persons who were officially registered by the government. However, further discussion is necessary on the disclosure of personal information in massive disasters.
4. Supports by JDF
Immediately subsequent to the disaster, JDF began providing its support, collaborating with some related organizations. As a result, three support centers have been established, acting as the hub of our activities.
- Miyagi Center (Established on March 30, 2011, and its major activities were taken over by the local organization at the end of 2011)
- Fukushima Center (Established on April 6, 2011, still active)
- Iwate Center (Established on September 22, 2011, still active)
Their major activities are, 1) safety confirmation at the earliest stage, 2) support provision at the evacuation center (including delivery of necessary goods), 3) reopening of the workshops of disabled persons (cleaning and repair related), 4) move from evacuation centers to temporary housing and checking the places to be restored, and 5) transportation support from temporary housing (to hospitals and stores). Requests were received from Minami-Soma City, Fukushima and Rikuzen-Takada City, Iwate, and surveys have been conducted with the registered disabled persons (the one in the former completed and the one in the latter still in progress). The number of total support personnel was more than 5,000 at the Miyagi Center and over 3,000 at the Fukushima Center. All the expenses incurred during the support were covered by donations from domestic and foreign organizations and individuals. Much gratitude is expressed to them on this occasion.
5. Future challenges
1) Basic challenges
For the time being, the major focus will be on the recovery policy on the Great East Japan Earthquake, and in parallel to this, preparation for future natural disasters is necessary, including that for a presumably inevitable Tohnankai Great Earthquake. From the perspective of "massive disaster and disability," at least the following research should be conducted and considerations should be given on the following points by the national and local governments, together with the private sector.
A. Research by the government on "the Great East Japan Earthquake and disabled persons"
- Exact figures of the dead and the missing.
- The living conditions since the disaster (life under the disrupted lifelines, at the evacuation centers and temporary housing, evacuation to outside the prefecture)
- Effectiveness of the existing policies. (The List of People Who Need Support in Emergencies and the Private Information Protection Law)
B. Substantial participation of disabled persons in the recovery policy at the national and local levels.
- Inclusion of disability issues by the newly established Reconstruction Agency
- Participation of disabled persons in the recovery plans at the national, prefectural and local levels.
2) Current challenges
A. Support for disabled persons who fell victim to the earthquake
- Repair of temporary housing (including "minashi-kasetsu," housing rented by the victims but paid for by the government)
- Transportation support
- Employment and work support (securing workplaces and jobs at private companies, welfare workshops, etc.)
- Self-employment support (providing support during cessation from work for those who work in acupuncture, moxibustion, massage and the like)
B. Dealing with the compensation issue against the nuclear power plant accident of Tokyo Electric Power Company (resolving the disadvantageous situations of disabled persons)
3) Challenges of JDF
A. Presenting proposals and requests to the national government
B. Responding to the needs of disaster-stricken area (sending support personnel, conducting research, etc.)
C. Recording the support activities (making a documentary film, reports, etc.)
D. Fund-raising for long-term support activities.
In conclusion, it is hoped that the outcome of this expert meeting, including our presentation, will make a great contribution to the high-level ministerial conference that will be held in Sendai, Miyagi on July 3 and 4 as well as to the UN International Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2015.